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This paper attempts to answer two lingering questions pertaining to Japan’s new 
privacy laws that passed on 25 April 2003. One question is the impetus behind the 
introduction of such a bill when concerns of the citizenry and the prevalence of 
information privacy infringements were unable to draw any kind of measured 
government response for more than two decades. The second question is whether the 
law can be considered new in any respect, or whether it is a rehashing of Japan’s 
traditional legal informal system as posited by Frank Upham. The author begins with a 
summary of the legal environment in Japan surrounding privacy before moving on to a 
series of case studies to illustrate the passiveness of the ruling elites. Then, the Political 
Opportunity Structure (POS) expanded upon by Sidney Tarrow will be used to evaluate 
how and why the initial bill came to be proposed by the LDP-led coalition in 2000. 
Lastly, problems with the new law will be touched upon. The analysis provided in this 
paper will show that the Liberal Democratic Party only treated the new privacy bill as a 
means to an end, with it acting as a front for pursuing its own agendas. In addition, the 
author will show that while the new law is regarded prima facie as a watershed in 
upholding the privacy rights of Japanese citizens, it essentially still falls within the 





1.1 Enigma of Japan’s New Privacy Laws 
 In April 2005, Japan will see the enactment of five new privacy laws as part of a 
comprehensive package with the stated aim of protecting online information (Yūhikaku 
2003). This is the first time that Japan will have a comprehensive package of privacy 
laws that cover both the public and private sectors. Considering that Japan has been a 
stringent proponent of self-regulation for over two decades, the passage of these new 
laws appears to be a watershed in the protection of online privacy. After all, the privacy 
debate in Japan has been around since the 70s. That was an era when computerization 
was a catchword, and administrative organs were struggling to enact ordinances in the 
face of increasing infringements regarding information usage. Thus, one question that 
strikes one immediately regarding these new laws is why the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP)-led coalition has decided to bring them into force at this time. What was the 
impetus leading to the submission of a draft privacy bill in 2001’s Diet session, when 
the issue had been on the back burner for so many years? 
 
 Moreover, since the impetus for the new law originated from the upper echelons 
of the Japanese political system, a second question to be asked is whether it can be 
expected to move away from Japan’s traditional approach towards adjudication? 
Traditional here refers to Frank Upham (1987)’s suggestion that the Japanese 
bureaucracy has always supported a system of “legal informality”. The concept points 
to a system where laws that have been intentionally left ambiguous so that potential 
litigants would be forced to turn to the bureaucracy for advice first. Adding new laws 
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would only be detrimental to such a system, as they formalize the pathways to litigation, 
and depose of the bureaucracy as a mediator. This aspect of the Japanese legal 
institution has been supported by the work of other researchers. For example, Haley 
(1992) has argued that because the Japanese state is an “authority without power,” 
government officials have had to depend on informal sanctions, or administrative 
guidance, to further their aims. Administrative guidance itself is argued by Johnson 
(1982) as the logical outcome of a developmental state founded only upon general laws 
that lack any real substance. The proclivity of the Japanese legal system is so endemic, 
argues Feldman (2000), that a set of social mores has developed to legitimize the 
informal process. Thus, any kind of emphasis on one’s legal rights would lead to public 
disdain, as it paints a picture of a selfish individual who is abhorrent of more amenable 
means of reconciliation. 
 
Yet, in spite of the scholarship that supports Upham’s thesis, several authors 
have recently suggested that Japan is witnessing a “regime shift” away from such a 
unilateral system (Nottage 2004, p. 7); Nottage further claims that laws in Japan are 
now more substance than style. In his research on the formulation of the NPO Law, 
Pekkanen (2000) further suggests that the pluralistic environment in Japan is evidence 
that the state’s power to propagate informal modes of mediation is waning. However, it 
is the position of the author that, while the Japanese state apparatus may entertain a 
more pluralistic system, its aims are nonetheless to maintain the status quo. This paper 
adopts the more measured stand suggesting that pluralism does not necessarily equate 
to more effective legislation. This is akin to the findings of Maclachlan (2002), whose 
work on consumer advocacy showed that the influence of advocacy groups on the state 
is still mediated ultimately, by what is in the best interests of the state. Thus, while the 
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new privacy bill has the potential to break new ground since it was backed by 
politicians rather than the bureaucracy, the question of just how revolutionary the new 
law actually is still remains. One may perhaps surmise that it is exactly because the new 
laws do not tread on previously established holy ground that that the LDP-coalition was 
willing to put up a draft bill for debate. The paper presented here will show that 
keeping the essence of legal informality within the scope of new legislation in Japan is 
still within the influence of the state by attempting to answer the two questions 
presented earlier. It will put into perspective: a) the way the Japanese government has 
dealt with privacy in Japan since the 70s, and the more recent events that have paved 
the way for the new legislation; and b) the contents of the new Basic Law, and whether 
it moves significantly away from the an informal system of administration. 
 
The contents of this thesis will be as follows: Chapters One-Two will contain 
background information related to the first question. For the rest of this chapter will, a 
summary of the past and present legal situation in Japan with regards to privacy 
protection in general will be presented. This information will clearly reveal that the 
Japanese government’s stand on privacy regulation has heretofore been one of 
voluntary self-regulation rather than overt interference. In this way, it provides a 
context that will lend significance to the events leading up to the birth of the new law. 
Furthermore, Following this, Chapter Two will illustrate several muted Japanese 
government responses towards revising the old legal framework when it complicated 
attempts to prosecute those who had infringed upon personal information privacy. This 
is done with the aim of showing how the Japanese government has consistently kept the 
non-interference status quo in spite of massive outcries for it to regulate information 
privacy. Chapter Three will deal directly with the new law, and begins with an 
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introduction to the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) as expanded upon by Sidney 
Tarrow (1998). This will serve as a framework to elucidate the events behind the 
passing of the new privacy bill, and bring to light the reasons for the Japanese 
government’s change in position regarding information privacy. Chapter Four will open 
with an introduction into Upham’s thesis, as the focus turns to the second question of 
whether the new law moves away from the legal informal environment. As the law is 
still too recent for there to be a discussion utilizing case law, a consideration of its inner 
workings will be undertaken through an analysis of its contents. 
 
1.2 Background on Privacy Legislation in Japan 
1.2.1 The Public Sector 
The right to privacy has been recognized under Japanese case law as a 
constitutional right by the Tokyo District Court since 1964 (World Trade Executive 
2001). It was then that former Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita won a suit against the 
author Yukio Mishima for using him as a model for a novel without permission. While 
this is a landmark case in itself, it did little to further the protection of one’s private 
information, which was something that had to wait more then two more decades. In the 
meantime, Japan in the 70s entered an age of computerization, and had to face up to all 
the inherent problems of illegality that comes together with the ability to amass huge 
amounts of information. The forefront of the privacy debate during this time was not 
led by the national government, but the labour unions, which repeatedly pushed for 
local administrative bodies to put into effect ordinances to safeguard their workers 
(Horibe 1980). From the passing of the first local ordinance regulating computerized 
data processing by Kunitachi City, Tokyo in 1975, 52.9 percent of local governments in 
Japan by 2000 now had their own local bylaws regarding this issue; the national 
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government contribution, on the other hand, was to indirectly contribute to a growing 
concern over misuse of information; its proposal for a national identification number 
system without the proper checks and balances stirred much debate on the issue. The 
system was eventually so inundated by the resistance towards it that the government 
was forced to yield its position (Center for Social and Legal Research 2000). Instead, 
the watershed for privacy protection at the national level only came when Japan 
became a signatory of the 1980 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)’s “Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data”. These guidelines, while not binding, were 
enacted in order to provide a framework for participant countries to promote laws that 
would strike a balance between the marketing efforts of businesses with the privacy 
concerns of consumers (Culnan and Bies 2003). Broadly speaking, the guidelines 
focused on the propagation of Fair Information Principles, which can be broadly 
grouped into four categories: (1) Notice, (2) Choice, (3) Access, and (4) Security. Table 
1 summarizes the tenets underlying these groupings. 
 
Table 1. Fair Information Principles under the 1980 OECD Guidelines 
Category OECD Principle Tenet 
Notice Purpose Specification The purposes for which personal data are 
collected should be specified not later than at 
the time of data collection and the subsequent 
use limited to the fulfillment of those 
purposes or such others as are not 
incompatible with those purposes and as are 
specified on each occasion of change of 
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purpose 
Choice Collection Limitation There should be limits to the collection of 
personal data and any such data should be 
obtained by lawful and fair means and, where 
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of 
the data subject 
Access Individual Participation An individual should have the right to obtain 
from a data controller, or otherwise, 
confirmation of whether or not the data 
controller has data relating to him…to 
challenge data relating to him and, if the 
challenge is successful, to have the data 
erased, rectified, completed or amended 
Security Security Safeguards and 
Accountability 
Personal data should be protected by 
reasonable security safeguards against such 
risks as loss or unauthorized access, 
destruction, use, modification or disclosure of 
data; A data controller should be accountable 
for complying with measures which give 
effect to the principles stated above. 
 
In 1988, a law pursuant to the OECD guidelines known as the “Law Concerning 
the Protection of Computer Processed Personal Data Held by Administrative Organs” 
was passed in Japan. This law came at a time amidst heightened concern among the 
Japanese populace towards the danger of privacy invasion. A 1985 poll by the 
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Management and Coordination Agency revealed that since a similar poll four years 
earlier, there had been a 25 percent increase in the number of respondents who were 
interested in the issue of privacy; in addition, 70 percent of respondents were expecting 
greater invasions of privacy as Japan progressed towards becoming an information 
society (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 1985). The same poll also revealed that Japanese 
people thought personal information abuse would come primarily from the government. 
This was reflected in the 75.7 percent of pollees who wanted more measures to protect 
information kept by government agencies. Their fears were not unfounded, as 
municipal offices had a history of releasing information from family registers, or koseki, 
to commercial entities. For example, families with children who had reached school-
going age would find their mailboxes filled with direct mail marketing school supplies 
or promoting cram schools (Tsuzuki 1986). Such acts spurred the government to pass 
the 1988 Law to better safeguard personal information and allay public fears. However, 
it has been largely ineffective in this regard, as it only requires government bodies to 
make public the information that they are collecting, and also to allow individuals 
access to this information for verification purposes. As a piece of legislation, it does not 
appear to either obey the letter or the spirit of the OECD guidelines. There s nothing to 
prevent the release of information to third parties, and also no penalties are stipulated 
for those who break the law. Table 2 shows the legislations that cover information 
handling by the national and prefectural governments in Japan. 
 
Table 2. Legislation Related to Privacy for Public Administrative Bodies in Japan 
Name of Legislation Articles Description Penalties  




Implicit references to 




Japanese case law 
Law Concerning the Protection 
of Computer Processed 
Personal Data Held by 
Administrative Organs (1988) 
- Requires government 
bodies to make public 
the type of information 
they are collecting, 
and also to allow 
individual access to 
verify and correct this 
information 
None 
Basic Law on the Formation of 
an Advanced Information and 
Telecommunications Network 
Society (2000) 
- Provides a framework 
for state and local 
governments to 
formulate IT policies 
N.A. 
Law Concerning Disclosure of 
Information Held by 
Administrative Agencies 
(2001) 
- Requires government 
bodies to proactively 
respond to requests for 
disclosure of 
information as per 
1988 law 
No penalties for 
inappropriate 
nondisclosure 
Law Concerning the Protection 
of Personal Information held 
by Administrative Organs 
(2005) [supersedes 1988 law] 
- Requires government 
bodies to make public 
the type of information 
they are collecting, 
and also to allow 
Imprisonment of 
up to 2 years or 
a fine of up to 
¥1,000,000 
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individual access to 
verify and correct this 
information 
Law Concerning the 
Establishment of a Screening 
Committee for Information 
Disclosure and Personal 
Information Protection (2005) 
N.A. Provides a framework 
for the establishment 











Law Concerning the 
Establishment of Related Laws 
Accompanying the 
Enforcement of Related 
Legislation Concerning the 
Protection of Data Held by 
Public Administrative Organs 
(2005) 
N.A. Provides a framework 
for the enactment of 
industry specific 
information privacy 





1.2.2 Attention Moves towards the Private Sector 
The advent of the nineties saw privacy concern being redirected towards the 
private sector. This was prompted by the exacerbation of credit card fraud through the 
theft of magnetically stored information, an act known as skimming. By the late 1990s, 
the loss incurred by merchants because of this jumped by more than seven times, from 
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¥1.2 billion to ¥9.1 billion between 1997 and 1999 (Japan Weekly Monitor 2000). To 
counter this threat to a fledging e-commerce market, a fact finding team was sent to the 
U.S. to study the solutions that had been enacted there. Although this resulted in 
revisions to Japan’s penal codes that ensured stiffer penalties for skimming, there was 
still no law that was directly related to individual privacy. The private sector has thus 
been left to draft their own privacy polices using ministerial guidelines, and are kept in 
check by sectoral laws (i.e., where each industry has its own law) that, in theory, offer 
some privacy rights protection for consumers (Horibe 2003). For example, Article 5 of 
the Telecommunications Business Law (MPT 1984) have provisions relating to the 
release of customer information, while Article 4 of the Unauthorized Computer Access 
Law (NPA 2000) provides an avenue for litigation against those who facilitate 
unauthorized access to computer databases. Similarly, July 2001 revisions to the penal 
code placed an outright ban on the theft of electromagnetic information (e.g., 
information stored in the magnetic strip of a credit card). Prior to this, the law only 
recognized the theft of property that was tangible and disregarded the pilfering of 
information as a crime. Table 3 lists the laws that are related to the protection of online 
consumer information (see Appendix A for a more complete accounting of laws with 
privacy provisions for private enterprises).  
 
Table 3. Japanese Laws Related to Online Consumer Information Privacy 
Name of Legislation Articles Description Penalties  
Telecommunications 




intercepting the private 
Imprisonment of 
up to 2 years or a 
fine of up to 
¥1,000,000 
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communication of users  
Unauthorized Computer 
Access Law (2000) 
3, 4 Prohibits acts of 
unauthorized computer 





up to 1 year or a 
fine of up to 
¥500,000; fine of 
up to ¥300,000 
respectively 






Bans the possession and 
theft of electromagnetic 
information through 
skimming (in addition to 
the manufacture and use of 
electromagnetic records) 
Imprisonment of 
up to 5 years or a 
fine of up to 
¥300,000; 
Imprisonment up 




9 Prohibits the interception 
of cabled communications 
Imprisonment of 
up to 3 years or a 
fine of up to 
¥1,000,000 
Law Concerning the 
Protection of Personal 
Information (2005) 
N.A. Provides the framework 
for the establishment of a 
basic information handling 
policy by the government 
for the private sector 
Imprisonment of 
up to 6 months or 
a fine of up to 
¥300,000 
Law Concerning the 
Protection of Personal 
N.A. Provides a framework for 
the private sector to 
Imprisonment of 
up to 2 years or a 
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fine of up to 
¥1,000,000 
 
Ministerial guidelines are also based on the 1980 OECD guidelines (MPT 
1998a),” and have been issued by the ministries for their particular industries as per 
Japan’s sectoral approach towards privacy protection. The major industries can be 
separated along the following lines: employment, information and communications, 
finance, medical/welfare, agriculture, law, law enforcement, transportation, and 
regulated items by the Finance Ministry (Kitaoka 2004, pp. 279-281). Examples  from 
the information and communications sector would include guidelines issued by the 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), which are the main bureaucracies involved in Japan’s move 
towards the use of IT. The latter’s 1997 “Guidelines Concerning the Protection of 
Computer Processed Personal Data in the Private Sector” essentially covers the same 
points and serves the same purpose as MPT’s 1998 “Guidelines Regarding Protection 
of Individual Information in Telecommunications” (MPT 1998b). However, MPT’s 
directives apply only to telecommunications companies, while MITI’s version is 
directed to all other private enterprises that collect the personal information of users 
through the Internet (MITI 1997).  
 
 As it can be seen from this brief overview of the legal environment concerning 
privacy in Japan, it is very clear that the powers-that-be have taken a position that can 
best be described as one that is based on administrative guidance and substantialism, or 
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voluntary self-control (Mashima and Katsuya 1996). This is hardly surprising given the 
fact that Japan has always looked towards the US’s laissez faire model for instruction 
on how to set-up its own practices. (For example, the Japan Direct Marketing 
Association (JADMA)’s guidelines for safeguarding consumer privacy were based 
largely on the U.S. Direct Marketing Association’s own set of rules (Taylor, Franke and 
Maynard 2000)). Yet, while the U.S. system affords many avenues to seek redress in 
the courts, Mashima and Katsuya (1996) have argued that voluntary rather than 
mandatory participation to guidelines have reduced the legal recourse of consumers in 
Japan. This problem is further compounded by the lack of “a close and longstanding 
relationship between regulators and the [cyberspace] industry.” What mitigates this 
accusation is that such a system implicitly allows for ministerial intervention when 
necessary in cases of misdemeanour. The next chapter then, will take a look at these 
regulatory practices at work, which will determine whether the Japanese government 





 This chapter will detail the national government’s reaction towards personal 
information infringements through the use of four case studies. As Japan is regulated 
differently depending on whether it is the private or public sector1, two cases from each 
have been selected. As governmental response also varies over time, the cases have 
been chosen such that they also approximate each other in terms of occurrence. They 
are, in order of presentation: The Sakura Bank Data Leak Incident (1998), The Uji City 
Resident Data Leak Incident (1999), The Yahoo! BB Data Leak Incident (2004), and 
The Defense Agency Lists (2002). These particular cases have been selected due to 
their severity, and the fact that they are very often the ones that immediately come to 
mind of the Japanese persons I have spoken to while working on this paper. By the end 
of this chapter, it will become apparent that the Japanese government has not only put 
in place a self-voluntary legal framework, but has also been largely passive on the 
administrative guidance front when violations do occur. 
 
2.1 Private Sector Case One: The Sakura Bank Data Leak Incident (1998) 
 Sakura Bank ceased to be an organizational entity after its April 2001 merger 
with Sumitomo Bank. Coming amidst the government’s Big Bang liberalization 
program, the highly anticipated merger was regarded as an epochal event, with two 
rival keiretsu (Mitsui and Sumitomo respectively) banks yielding to the post-bubble 
financial environment (Jiji Press Ticker Service 2000). The result was the birth of the 
behemoth ¥99 trillion Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation – what was then the third 
                                                 
1 Note that while the public sector is also differentiated according to national and local levels, this 
distinction is not so much of relevance here since what is being looked at here is the response of the 
national government to information privacy infringements. 
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largest financial institute in the world (Indian Express Newspapers 2000). Today, 
Sakura Bank lives only in the memory of individuals, and one of the most potent 
recollections regarding the bank is its entanglement in a data leak scandal that came to 
light during the early months of 1998. 
 
 The data leak was first reported to the Metropolitan Police Department in late 
December 1998 by CTC System Design Co. The firm was a sub-contractor to CTC 
Financial Engineering Co., which was the company directly contracted to Sakura 
Information Systems Co. (a Sakura Bank affiliate) for work on a searchable client 
database (Mainichi Daily News 1998a). 73-year-old Takeo Tamura, who was the 
president of List Library, a major company in the field of information collection for 
mailing list purposes, provided the initial smoking gun (Mainichi Daily News 1998c). 
He had initiated contact with two Sakura Bank employees in early December 1997, and 
tried to extort money in exchange for keeping his list of bank clientele from the media 
(The Yomiuri Shimbun 1998b). Tamura had declared that he was holding on to the 
personal data of at least twenty thousand out of the bank’s fifteen million customers. 
The comprehensiveness of Tamura’s data (72 categories of personal information per 
individual) led to suspicions by the bank of a breach in their database, and promptly 
began an in-house investigation. The results pointed to CTC System Design as the 
culprit, which subsequently gave notice of the data leak to the police. The company 
itself was unable to trace the source of the data outflow (Asahi Shimbun 1998a). Nobuo 
Iwata, the bank’s public relations officer, was able to confirm a data leak for only 
thirty-five of their clients, which included information such as their names and 
addresses, birthdays, and place of employment etc. (Asahi Shimbun 1998a). 
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2.1.1 The Police Investigations Begin 
 Tamura was brought in for questioning by the Third Criminal Investigative 
Section, which had been assigned to the case. He revealed that during the latter period 
of November 1997, he was approached by a young man who had with him a magneto-
optic (MO) disc, and a three-page printout. The printout was for a single person, and 
detailed the individual’s name, address, occupation, account balance and transactions, 
and housing loan information etc. (The Yomiuri Shimbun 1998a). While the originals 
remained with the young man, Tamura was able to retain a duplicate copy of the disc 
for ¥200,000. This revelation was the focus of police investigations, and it culminated 
with the arrest of 34-year-old Yasunori Fujisawa on 7 January 1998 to face charges of 
professional embezzlement (The Yomiuri Shimbun 1998a). Identified as the person 
who sold the MO disc to Tamura, Fujisawa was a section chief from Densan Software 
Inc., and had been dispatched to CTC System Design to head the Sakura Bank database 
project (Mainichi Daily News 1998b). Investigations led the police to suspect that 
Fujisawa had pilfered the client database software (with sensitive client data contained 
within) on two floppy disks while working out of CTC Itōchu Techno-Science 
Corporation’s Chiyoda ward office (Asahi Shimbun 1998b); during the suspected 2 
November heist, Fujisawa allegedly took the instruction manuals for the software 
together with printouts of some of the client information contained within (Asahi News 
Service 1998). This was the second time that Fujisawa had a transaction with List 
Library, the first being for another set of data sold in 1996; the circumstances for the 
sale this time were for the repayment of a personal debt amounting to several million 




2.1.2 The Second Arrest 
 In the meantime, Tamura was trying to bargain for a withdrawal of the police 
report filed by CTC System Design. On 5 January, he offered to sell the data to two 
other Sakura Bank employees below market price, a deal he balanced with a counter 
proposal for the bank to become a paying subscriber to his List Library (Jiji Press 
Ticket Service 1998). He also made written comments to them that it would not reflect 
well on Sakura Bank if it were to allow the information in his hands to become freely 
circulated. These actions were to no avail, however, as the Third Criminal Investigative 
Section hauled him in three days later under charges of attempted blackmail. Tamura 
declared in his defence that his sales pitch had not been done in earnest, and he hadn’t 
seriously thought that profit could be derived from it (Asahi Shimbun 1998c). 
 
2.1.3 Court Judgements and Case Repercussions 
 Fujisawa’s trial began on 16 April at the Tokyo District Court. Here, Fujisawa 
made an apology over his attempted sale of the data, but concurrently rejected the 
charges against him regarding the theft of the Sakura Bank client database software 
manuals. His lawyer declared in court that the manuals had no value as property since it 
was something that could be transmitted by facsimile instead of other more secure 
channels (Asahi Shimbun 1998d). However, this line of appeal failed as Fujisawa was 
handed down a mitigated eighteen month sentence suspended for three years in July by 
Judge Fumihiro Abe for criminal breach of trust (Mainichi Shimbun 1998). A 
suspended sentence meant that Fujisawa would not actually be locked in a penitentiary 
unless the same offence was committed within three years. On 13 May 1998, Tamura 
was also found guilty by the Tokyo District Court of attempting to extort money from 
Sakura Bank, and was sentenced a two-year jail term suspended for three years. 
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Presiding judge Junko Takagi commented that the ruling took into account that all the 
Sakura Bank client information had already been confiscated and destroyed by the 
police, and that the defendant had shown contrition for his malignant actions (Asahi 
Shimbun 1998e). Sakura Bank itself simply made a statement through their PR officer 
that steps had been taken to prevent further leaks (Dow Jones Asian Equities Report 
1998), while Terunori Tanaka, president of CTC Financial Engineering Co., took the 
fall and publicly apologized for all the trouble caused (Mainichi Daily News 1998b). 
 
In spite of the severity of the data leak, Sakura Bank did not broach upon the 
matter of compensation to its customers. In addition, the bank was not charged for 
negligence of any kind, and even those who were taken to task were able to escape 
serving time in the penitentiary. These are clear indicators as to how unimportant the 
problem of information privacy was looked upon by businesses and the judiciary. The 
government itself was no more responsive. With regards to the indictments, a 7 January 
Asahi Shimbun reported on how the lack of laws criminalizing information theft meant 
that Fujisawa had to be arrested for stealing software manuals instead (he had used his 
own diskettes to copy the information); the case for Tamura, on the other hand, had to 
revolve around his blackmail attempt rather than his purchase of stolen data. As the 
report noted, in all cases such as the Sakura Bank incident, the theft of information was 
always overlooked since the law did not account for such intangibles. Similarly, 
Mainichi (1998a) called for a complete revision of the Japanese legal framework 
concerning electronic information so that data merchants like Fujisawa could no longer 
acquire and sell customer data legally. At the same time, the newspaper also railed 
against Sakura Bank for not being prudent with the way its sub-contractors handled 
sensitive customer information. However, in spite of the widespread coverage given to 
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this case at the time, the government did not move to strengthen legislation protecting 
information privacy, nor was there any administrative guidance handed down to banks 
to prevent a recurrence. Such passiveness is reflective of government response with 
regards to privacy infringements in the private sector at the time. As the next case 
dealing with a local administrative body will reveal, however, it is perhaps more 
accurate to label the reactive element in the Japanese government as the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP). 
 
2.2 Public Sector Case One: The Uji City Resident Data Leak Incident (1999) 
 On 22 May 1999, a report in the Morning Edition of the Kyoto Shimbun was 
the first indication that the confidentiality of resident information held by the city of Uji 
in Kyoto Prefecture had been compromised (Sasaki 2004). The source of this news was 
a reporter from Kobe, who had discovered a set of information being sold under the 
heading, “Uji City’s Resident Information: 217,617 in Total” on the Web site of a 
consumer data company that was based in Osaka’s Sakai City (The Yomiuri Shimbun 
1999a). When contacted by a reporter from the Kyoto Shimbun, the businessman said 
that he was merely acting as a middleman for the source of the information, and that 
this source had specifically instructed him to refuse interviews from the mass media 
(Sasaki 2004). Nonetheless, the intrepid reporter was able to procure a part of the 
information, and subsequently handed it over to the Uji City Municipal Office for 
verification. 
 
 It was discovered that the leaked information comprised of thirty-three different 
items of information, such as the personal addresses, names, birthdates, and genders of 
the city’s residents. However, it was the presence of unique identification codes that the 
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municipal office had attached to each resident for purposes of electronic processing that 
truly implicated the local administrative body (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 1999). Once the 
city was implicated, it had little choice but to conduct an in-house investigation into the 
source of the leak. By a comparison of the number and type of data items on the leaked 
list, the municipal office was able to limit the scope of its investigations to a list that 
had been created for its Infant Physical Examination System; this had been devised as a 
way to track and deliver information on health services to families with 3-month old 
infants. The fabrication of this system had been consigned to a systems development 
company within Kyoto. However, the finished product had already been delivered to 
the city in April 1998, and subsequently came under the purview of the city’s Health 
Promotion Section (Asahi Shimbun 1999a). Using inductive reasoning, the city’s 
investigative committee concluded that the leak must have originated with this section 
since the company in Kyoto had used specialized equipment not readily accessible to 
the general public. Ultimately, a Magneto Optical (MO) drive attached to the Health 
Promotion Section’s computer was suspected to have facilitated the carrying out of the 
crime (Asahi Shimbun 1999b).  
 
2.2.1 Uji City Reaches a Mediated Resolution over Lists 
 The results of the in-house investigation were released to the public by Kubota 
Isamu, Uji city’s mayor, on 25 May. Since the actual human culprit behind the leak had 
not been found, the mayor declared that the fault was with the municipal office as a 
whole, and made clear that their attention would now be directed at damage control 
(Sasaki 2004). While the owner of the consumer data company had already taken down 
the Web site retailing the list on the 22nd, the leaked data was still his as far as the law 
was concerned; there were no local ordinances covering the seizure of data that had 
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been procured and sold illegally (The Yomiuri Shimbun 1999b). When negotiations 
with the businessman reached an impasse, the city decided to call in the local branch of 
the Kyoto Metropolitan Police to act as an intermediary. The businessman decided to at 
this point in time to yield his data, on the condition that the city, on their part, would 
allow the matter to rest as well. The city agreed to waive their right to prosecute since 
“none of the illegally acquired data had been used,” and on 26 May, received an 
apology letter from the businessman with the MO disc contained within (Sasaki 2004). 
On the 27th, an official from the municipal office visited the businessman’s Sakai City 
office to erase any residual resident information, and to ensure that it had been recalled 
from the three marriage consultancy companies to which it had been sold (Asahi 
Shimbun 1999c). At the same time, new information gleaned from interviews with the 
businessman was to unravel the earlier conclusions made by the office. 
 
2.2.2 The Debacle Enters a Legal Quagmire  
 The businessman in Sakai City revealed that he had bought the information for 
¥250,000 in May 1998, from a former graduate student who had been working part-
time for an Osaka-based information processing company. This company had been 
subcontracted by the Kyoto systems development company to create the lists that they 
would later use in developing the Infant Physical Examination System (Asahi Shimbun 
1999d). The student was attached to the project as an assistant engineer, and 
information provided by the Sakai City businessman confirmed the student’s identity as 
the person who had sold the information. However, both the information processing 
company and the student denied any wrongdoing when contacted by the police. In any 
case, since (i) the theft of intangibles (i.e., information) was not illegal, (ii) the student 
had used in own disc, and (iii) the subcontracted company had not entered into a 
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secrecy clause with either the city or the Kyoto subcontractor, there was little else that 
the police could do. Nonetheless, on 10 June 1999, Uji City filed a formal complaint 
alleging that the Kyoto system development company (with which it did have a 
contractually specified secrecy clause) and the student for breaching the local 
"Ordinance concerning the Protection of Personal Information Held by Uji City's 
Computer Organizations" (Asahi Shimbun 1999e).  
 
 The results of the Kyoto Public Prosecutor’s inquiry into the case came more 
than six months later, when they announced that they would not press charges against 
either the student or the company in Kyoto (Asahi Shimbun 1999f). Apparently, this 
decision was reached based on the fact that the ordinance in question had been repealed 
in April 1999 to make way for the "Uji City Personal Information Protection 
Ordinance". Even though the clauses covering the protection of personal information 
were the same in both laws, the lack of transitional measures in the newer ordinance 
meant that nothing could be done for crimes committed before April 1999. Ultimately, 
even if the city could have successfully brought the case to trial, and even if they 
emerged triumphant, their victory would have resulted only in a maximum fine of 
¥30,000. 
 
2.2.3 The Trial against the City Continues 
 Although the city’s own case had fallen, it was itself being sued (together with 
the Kyoto company) by three citizens of Uji City, including city assemblyman Kataoka 
Eiji (Asahi Shimbun 1999b). All three had information on the leaked data lists. Citing 
emotional anguish suffered by the privacy violations as a result of the data leak, they 
filed charges with the Kyoto District Court for damages amounting to one million yen 
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on 28 May 1999 (Sasaki 2004). After almost two years, the court finally reached a 
decision on 23 February 2001, when Chief Justice Yagi Ryōichi found the city guilty of 
not “exhausting thoroughly its obligation to ensure the secrecy of personal information 
by directing and supervising the part-time consignee” (Asahi Shimbun 2001a). He 
ordered the city and the Kyoto company to pay each of the plantiffs ¥15,000 as 
solatium. Kubota challenged this ruling, commenting that the court’s stipulation would 
make it impossible for local administrative bodies to engage in subcontracting. The city 
then lodged an appeal with the Osaka High Court on 6 March 2001, but lost the case 
again in December. Chief Justice Iwai Shun ruled that “The city had not paid adequate 
attention to its maintenance of secrets” (Asahi Shimbun 2001b). The city launched a 
final appeal with the Supreme Court, but the decision to compensate the plaintiffs was 
finalized when Chief Justice Fujii Masao of the court’s 1 Petty Bench upheld the 
previous decisions on 12 July 2002 (Asahi Shimbun 2002).  
 
2.2.4 Political Aftershocks of the Case 
It is quite clear again from this case that whether at the local or national level, 
much is still left to be desired in terms of personal information protection. Both felons 
were convicted of charges separate from the issue of data theft, and Uji City could not 
appeal on a national level in its case against the Kyoto systems development company 
because there was no Privacy Basic Law at the time. More importantly, the appearance 
of this case came at an inopportune time for the LDP, as the party was attempting to 
amend the Basic Resident Registers Law that would allow the koseki to be 
computerized. Chief policy maker of Komeito, Chikara Sakaguchi, was not amused by 
the fact that the city government had to negotiate for the return of the leaked data since 
the theft of property did not include intangibles. Since the opposition parties were 
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already opposed to the idea, the LDP could not have seen the bill through the Lower 
House without the support of its coalition partner. Thus, the LDP was forced to concede 
the implementation of “necessary measures to ensure the protection of personal 
information” in the revised Basic Resident Registers Law that passed the House of 
Representatives on 15 June 1999 (The Yomiuri Shimbun 1999b). As we can see here, 
the LDP was hardly concerned with putting in place any law to protect privacy, but had 
to compromise on the issue in order to move ahead with its own agenda. This issue will 
be covered in more detail in Chapter Three. 
 
2.3 Private Sector Case Two: The Yahoo! BB Data Leak Incident (2004) 
Yahoo! BB, which is the Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) network 
run by Softbank Corp. and Yahoo! Japan Corp., came under heavy commentary at a 
time when the Japanese diet had just passed its bill for the Protection of Personal 
Information. In January 2004, its 2.3 million subscribers made it the leading broadband 
service provider in Japan, and the first commercial provider to surpass the incumbent 
carrier - Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (NTT) (UTStarcom 2003). It did this 
through shrewd marketing by giving away free ADSL modems (Sekiguchi 2004), and 
by using Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer (DSLAM) technology to 
circumvent NTT’s monopoly of the Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) services in Japan 
(Ramsey 2001). 
 
On 23 January 2004, Softbank BB (which was overseeing operations of Yahoo! 
BB) announced that it was investigating the leakage of the personal data of 242 
subscribers to its Yahoo! BB ADSL service. The leak was first discovered when the 
perpetrator made contact with Softbank BB on 14 January (INTERNET Watch 2004b). 
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The contents of the leaked information consisted of five items: subscribers’ names, 
telephone numbers, email and home addresses, and date of subscription. As more 
sensitive information, such as credit card numbers and usage history were stored on a 
second Yahoo! BB database, this information remained secure (INTERNET Watch 
2004a).  
 
2.3.1 Two Separate Extortion Cases 
24 February saw new light shone on the case as the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Department announced four arrests that had been made thirteen days earlier in 
connection with the blackmailing of Softbank Corp. This news was broken by the 
Yomirui Shimbun, which labelled the incident as “possibly the worst ever personal 
information leak (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2004b)”. The case grew more complicated as 
the four men in custody were apparently part of two different extortion bids. Hiroyuki 
Kimata, an ex-employee for a Yahoo! BB agent in charge of customer services until 
June 2003, had sent an email on 17 January using the pseudonym “fuu fuu” to Softbank 
Corp. He wrote that he would publicly release the personal information of one million 
subscribers unless he was paid ¥10 million; a file with the personal data of 104 
subscribers was attached as proof (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2004d). Kimata threatened to 
release the rest of his data, but his plans were foiled when he was caught trying to pick 
up the blackmail money by police staking out at JR Nagoya Station. While it was later 
discovered that Kimata’s true stash ultimately amounted to the personal data for a little 
more than five hundred thousand subscribers stored on floppy disks (Asahi News 
Service 2004), this number turned out to be inconsequential compared to the second 
group of extortionists. 
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2.3.2 Data Leak of 4.5 Million Yahoo! BB Subscribers’ Personal Data 
Teruaki Yuasa, vice president of Yahoo! BB agent SST, was arrested together 
with two alleged accomplices, also on 11 February. They were apparently in possession 
of a DVD-ROM which contained the personal information of as many as 4.5 million 
people. The number was so high because the disc included the information of not only 
present subscribers, but also that of free trial subscribers, past subscribers, and 
applications that were still being processed (Softbank 2004). The leaked data consisted 
of two more items than that which Kimata had collected: the subscribers’ Yahoo! Email 
address and Yahoo! Japan ID. While it was not clear how the personal data had been 
acquired, the leak became apparent to Softbank BB when Yuasa first made contact with 
an executive of Club iT (an antenna maker affiliated with Softbank Corp.) on 7 January, 
asking for ¥2-3 billion to fix a technical problem at Yahoo! BB which had allowed data 
to be leaked. A meeting with a Softbank official followed on 21 January, where he 
handed over a list of the personal data for 130 people, and the DVD-ROM made its 
appearance yet a day later (INTERNET Watch 2004c, The Yomiuri Shimbun 2004e). 
Softbank BB formally filed for damages on the 27th, and Yuasa and his alleged 
accomplices were subsequently taken into custody. 
 
2.3.3 Outcome of Softbank BB’s Internal and Police Investigations 
On 3 March, Tokyo public prosecutors formally indicted Kimata and Yuasa on 
charges of attempting to blackmail Softbank Corp. (Jiji Press Ticker Service 2004). 
Kimata was suspected by police to have copied the data during his time as an employee 
of a Yahoo! BB agent. Cost-cutting measures put in place by Yahoo! BB had seen it 
depend heavily on temporary staff. This was to the extent that in November 2003, 93 
out of 135 employees who had full access to its subscriber information databases were 
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job agency dispatches (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2004f). Beyond these 135 employees, a 
flaw in the Yahoo! BB database allowed all personnel working in a customer support 
role to access information rather liberally from the main database, and to make copies 
of this information. While the flaw was corrected September 2003, this was probably 
after Kimata had already pilfered the data (Asahi News Service 2004). Yuasa alleges 
that he had obtained the DVD-ROM from a Taiwanese rating company (Jiji Press 
Ticker Service 2004). However, Softbank’s internal investigation showed no signs of 
illegal access into their databases, indicating that Yuasa probably had help from a 
Softbank employee (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2004c), although this person has yet to be 
found. 
 
2.3.4 Yahoo! BB and Government Reactions 
 On 27 February, Yahoo! Japan Corp. also set up an Information Task Force, 
headed by President and CEO Masahiro Inoue, to study ways to prevent a recurrence of 
the data leak (Yahoo! Japan 2004). Softbank BB itself reacted to the massive data leak 
by offering ¥500 gift certificates to all Yahoo! BB subscribers, past and present, who 
were affected. All Yahoo! BB users were also allowed to file applications to change 
their email address usernames gratis. Yahoo! BB President and CEO, Masayoshi Son, 
Vice-President and COO Ken Miyauchi, and CTO and Director of the Board Takashi 
Tsutsui all took pay cuts from three to six months. The former two also headed an 
Investigation Committee to trace the source of the leaks, although answers have not 
been forthcoming (Softbank Corporation 2004). With regards to access to the Yahoo! 
BB database, authorization was now only allowed to 58 people, from the original 135 
(Asahi News Service 2004). Reactions from other members of the industry appeared 
conservative: Fujitsu commented that their temporary employees were well-screened, 
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while NTT Data President Tomokazu Hamaguchi said that “appealing to the 
conscience of systems operators to abide by rules is effective” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
2004) 
  
In light of the severity of the Yahoo! BB case, which coincided with data leaks 
by Acca Networks Co. and Lawson Inc., government response was swift and severe. 
The MPHPT issued administrative guidance to all telecommunications businesses to 
clean up their act with regards to managing the personal data of their clients. The Japan 
Internet Providers Association received instructions to ensure that service providers (1) 
improve on the ways they handle personal information and to control access to their 
databases, (2) improve on their personal information protection guidelines if necessary, 
and (3) report all cases of data leaks (MPHPT 2004). Softbank was also given specific 
instructions to provide some kind of compensation to those affected by the data leak 
(The Yomiuri Shimbun 2004c). In addition, MPHPT began taking measures to revise 
the penal code such that future cases would see the service provider punished for their 
negligence. Under the current legal framework, employees of Softbank could not be 
punished because (1) the Unauthorized Computer Access Law does not cover illegal 
access by authorized users, and (2) the penal code does not have provisions for theft of 
information beyond cash/credit cards etc. (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2004g). The 2005 
Law Concerning the Protection of Personal Information, on the other hand, would have 
allowed Softbank to have been punished if their negligence had abetted the information 
theft. A bill is expected to be submitted by the ministry commissioned panel by 2005. 
 
 As with the earlier cases, the Yahoo! BB Data Leak Incident once again 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Japanese laws in persecuting those who violate or 
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fail to protect personal information. Furthermore, the writing had already been on the 
wall that a case of this magnitude had been waiting to happen. As the earlier Sakura 
Bank and Uji cases have shown, many of Japan’s data leak cases stem from sub-
contractees running away with secure data. Yet, the government had merely turned a 
deaf ear in spite of calls time and again for more to be done against irresponsible 
outsourcing. Probably what is more significant in this case is the immediate 
“intervention” by the MPHPT in issuing renewed guidelines, probably due to the 
severity of the data leak. However, the noteworthiness of this action is mitigated by the 
fact that the new privacy bill had already passed through both houses of the Diet by this 
time. Since the new law places much significance on administrative guidance from the 
ministries, they would have had to issue guidelines before the laws were to come into 
effect anyway. Instead, as the Uji Case and the following Defense Agency case will 
show, what often draws a governmental response is the potential of a political fallout, 
rather than the safeguarding of personal information. 
 
2.4 Public Sector Case Two: The Defense Agency Lists (2002) 
 News that Japan’s Defense Agency might have been compiling personal 
information illegally first broke on 28 May 2002. Mainichi Shimbun (2002a) reported 
the first details of a case that would reach controversial proportions within the next 
month. Here, it was reported that the Defense Agency had appended to a list of the 
hundred odd people who had requested from it the release of public information, their 
occupations, and ideological biases and/or other background information as well. 
Samples of such additions included, “mother of SDF applicant, “symbolic activist in an 
anti-U.S. base campaign,” and “anti-war SDF Official”. These lists were allegedly put 
together by an officer in the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) Public Information 
 30
Release Office, since the appended information was not included in the submitted 
applications; only the applicant’s name and address were required (Asahi News Service 
2002c). This report was followed closely by another shocking revelation that the 
Defense Agency might have engaged in a systematic cover-up on its misdeeds (Nikkei 
Net 2002b). While early reports suggested that this was a one-off incident – Secretary 
of State for Defense General Nakatani himself was completely in the dark – the 
Defense Agency’s own investigations were to prove otherwise. There was an 
immediate cry of outrage from the intellectual community, who deemed the Defense 
Agency’s acts to have violated the 2001 Information Disclosure Law and Article 19 of 
the Japanese Constitution guaranteeing freedom of thought (Mainichi Shimbun 2002a). 
In addition, opposition politicians from the Liberal Party (LP), the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) were all quick to issue criticisms regarding the scandal (The Yomiuri Shimbun 
2002a). 
 
Six days after the scandal came to light, Nakatani updated the public in a press 
conference, and apologized for the anxiety which had been caused to the public (The 
Japan Times 2002). More importantly, it was revealed that what the agency had 
originally claimed to be an isolated incident, was in actuality a systematic and 
widespread compilation of data on those who had submitted public information 
requests; it was systematic in that higher officials were privy to the lists’ existence, and 
widespread because the lists had been compiled by the Internal Bureau, Ground and Air 
Staff Offices, and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency as well. In addition, 
the latter lists were posted on the Defense Agency LAN, where it could be accessed and 
saved by anyone within the agency. What was becoming a grave violation of citizen 
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rights prompted the Citizen's Ombudsman Association (which had submitted 
information requests) to file an appeal for an independent inquiry into the case (Japan 
Citizen's Ombudsman Association 2002). However, the attention of LDP politicians, 
and Senior Vice Minister for Defense Yasunari Ito seemed to be on finding out the 
source that leaked the news story to Mainichi in the first place instead (Mainichi 
Shimbun 2002b). Such a response came at a time when the LDP’s attempts to amend a 
law as part of an e-government initiative was being stymied in the Diet. This no doubt 
explains why there was even a government reaction at all, since LDP party members 
would no doubt have been greatly put-off by the scandal’s breaking at such an 
inopportune time. Under such circumstances, where all parties were in favor of a quick 
end, it is not surprising that the investigation would only be conducted in-house (Nikkei 
Net 2002a). 
 
2.4.1 Defense Agency’s Investigation Report 
On 11 June 2002, the results of the internal inquiry conducted by the Defense 
Agency were released to the press (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2002c). The report was split 
into three parts covering each of the implicated branches of the Defense Agency, and a 
fourth part listing measures to prevent a reoccurrence (Appendix B). First on the report 
were details on the MSDF case, which had been the mainstay of the original reports, 
and was the one people were most familiar with. Investigations had revealed that an 
officer (Lieutenant Commander A) in the Public Information Release Office had 
compiled the lists at his own initiative. He was found to have illegally passed on his list 
to nine other people outside his office. In addition the appellation of ideological 
orientation and occupation etc. of the applicants were also deemed inappropriate as 
they were beyond the scope necessary for the release of public information. This officer 
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was thus charged with breaking Articles twelve and four of the 1988 Law Concerning 
the Protection of Computer Processed Personal Data Held by Administrative Organs 
respectively. 
 
The second part of the report covered the Internal Bureau, and the Ground and 
Air Staff Offices’ lists. The lists from these Defence Agency branches contained 
appended information on the occupations of those requesting for the release of public 
information, such as “Radio/Television,” and “Ombudsmen,” and had been posted on 
their LANs. The investigation, however, found that the various branches needed this 
information as part of their process to fulfil requests for public information, and was 
therefore not unlawful in any way; no details were given as to how the process was 
aided by such information. The fact that these lists came to be construed as illegal was 
blamed on inaccurate reporting by the agency to Nakatani during the early days of the 
scandal. Nonetheless, officials of the Air Staff Public Information Release Office who 
had sent the list to an Investigative Office in Tokyo without authorization were found 
guilty of violating the 1988 privacy law. In addition, it was reported that the alleged 
cover-up, in which these branches were implicated, was in reality an attempt by 
officials to correct the mistake of having those lists on the internal LAN in the first 
place. As such, the incident was termed as an “inappropriate” act that should have been 
carried out after conferring with higher authorities, rather than an attempt at 
concealment. 
 
Lastly, the report detailed the list that was in the possession of the Facilities 
Planning Division of the Defence Agency’s Facilities Department. This list, containing 
the organizations from which applicants for public information belonged to, had been 
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posted on the agency’s internal LAN as well. As such additional information was once 
again said to be necessary for processing applications, only its posting on the internal 
LAN was deemed as contravening the privacy law. Overall, the Defense Agency 
faulted the whole incident on a lack of awareness for the management of personal 
information endemic throughout the organization, and promised to remedy the situation 
through training sessions. 
 
2.4.2 Aftermath of the Defense Agency List Scandal 
 The investigation into the Defense Agency lists was officially closed on 21 June 
when the secretariat investigating the case was disbanded (The Yomiuri Shimbun 
2002d). Since the 1988 privacy law did not have punitive provisions, 29 officials, 
including Nakatani himself, received punishments under the Self-Defense Forces Law 
that varied between pay-cuts and official reprimands. However, the political fallout 
from this scandal proved to be of greater significance, as will be covered in Chapter 
Three. While officially closed, the scandal of the Defense Agency lists would later be a 
watershed in privacy legislation in Japan when the Tokyo District Court handed down a 
ruling on the case almost two years later on 13 February 2004. Judge Akio Dohi 
awarded the plaintiff Tsutomu Kuji ¥100,000 in damages for mental distress when the 
Defense Agency was found guilty of violating the Law Concerning Disclosure of 
Information Held by Administrative Agencies (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2004a). Kuji had 
been labeled a “self-styled hack” by the MSDF official who handled his application for 
public information. This was the first time that a government body had been sentenced 
under a law dealing with personal information. The same court had rejected earlier 
lawsuits filed in mid-2002 by Kuji against Prime Minister Koizumi and Nakatani 
saying that, "Individual civil servants do not bear responsibility” (The Japan Times 
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2004). At the time of writing, a second case filed by a different plaintiff is still 
undergoing trial in the Niigata District Court. 
 
2.5 Passivity of the Japanese Government and Ineffectiveness of Laws 
The review of Japanese legislative frameworks in Chapter One revealed a 
pattern where no penalties exist for offenders from public administration, while a fine 
or imprisonment, in theory, awaits individuals (and not corporations) from the private 
sector. The IT policies relating to governmental bodies at present are dependent on an 
assumption of self-righteousness on their part to discharge their responsibilities to the 
public. The private sector, while covered under a number of laws, has generally been 
left to self-regulate as is the case with the U.S. The case studies here have shown that 
this style of governance has not been particularly effective at stopping data theft, nor 
has the Japanese government intervened actively when called upon to plug the 
loopholes. The present state of events can be attributed largely to institutional reasons. 
Hiramatsu (1993) notes that laws in Japan are generally toothless as Japanese officials 
only draft bills that are passable; those that come with strict penalties will not survive 
passage through the Diet. The low regard Japanese bureaucrats have of the Japanese 
Fair Trade Commission also means that it has been unable to effectively defend 
consumer rights, which includes the protection of consumer information (Herbig and 
Palumbo 1994). Furthermore, the non-litigious leanings of Japanese society (Ishikawa 
and Naganuma 1995), whether culturally or institutionally based, mean that regulation 
has largely been left to the industries involved without any enforcement from the 
Japanese government. Contributing to this “harmonious” society has been the 
government’s penchant for pre-empting large scale citizen movements by encouraging 
informal mediation methods of dispute settlement. Very clearly, laws in Japan have 
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allowed the companies handling personal information to escape unscathed, while the 
individuals involved have had to be punished under different rulings. Now that the 
Japanese government’s modus operandi on privacy issues has been established, the next 




THE ENACMENT OF THE NEW PRIVACY BILL 
 
 As we have seen from the previous two chapters, violations of privacy have 
been taking place in Japan since even before the 1980s, and concern among the 
populace was discernable from government surveys. What then, was the catalyst that 
led the Japanese government to introduce a new privacy bill into the Diet for 
deliberation? In addition, why was there such a vigorous negative response to this move 
when exactly such government action has been demanded for the last two decades? The 
answers to these questions require a much closer scrutiny of the course of the bill from 
its inception up till its successful passage through the Lower House. First, however, it is 
necessary to introduce the framework under which this discussion will proceed. 
 
3.1 The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) 
 The POS was first put forward by Peter K. Eisinger in 1973 as a way to 
determine the structural elements that were conducive towards a mobilization of protest 
movements. Such an analytical outline sits in contrasts with theories of resource 
mobilization; the former is inclined towards external resources that a group can use to 
wage a protest. For the purposes of this discussion, the POS that has been elaborated 
upon by Tarrow (1998) will be covered in more detail.  
 
 While Tarrow’s dissertation lists several stimuli that can provide the breeding 
grounds for dissent, just one of the factors he mentions can lead to the formation of a 
social movement. The present case for Japan sees five of them represented. In addition 
to these, it is also possible to derive a general rule regarding the affiliations of the 
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players involved. In an environment of centralized control like that of Japan, change 
and any interest groups for or against this change will naturally originate from the top. 
Thus, there should exist a situation where there is (1) contention among the ruling elite. 
This group might at the same time be (2) in a position of weakness with regards to 
enacting new legislation. In such a situation, those in power might be forced to 
accommodate change rather than to simply ignore or repress it; if a split exists within 
the ranks of the mandarins, the inertia in challenging their authority might be shaken 
away from parties that are in opposition. Next, interest groups at the grassroots level 
should be in a position where (3) the most harm will be suffered from inaction. In such 
a situation, the likelihood is that they (4) will stand up to oppose the government’s 
position as non-political actors. The opposition lawmakers and interest groups will 
then coexist in a symbiotic relationship; having allies within the political structure 
serves as an avenue for registering discontent for the non-politically affiliated, while 
they will simultaneously strengthen the voice of the parties that are in opposition. One 
factor that can be of service to these disenfranchised segments is a (5) collective 
organizational identity. If there are too many players at the bargaining table, the pie 
will be sliced so thin that any kind of discontent will eventually deflate the group’s 
momentum to push forward its objectives. Finally, it is important to note here that as a 
general rule, the POS allows for all actors to switch their affiliations according to 
changes within and without the climate within which contention exists. This is actually 
intuitive, since the roots of political opportunity are external, they are not servants to 
the whims and fancies of the players involved. So, for example, an existing partner to 





3.2 The Root of the Debate: Computerizing the Koseki 
 The story of how the new privacy act in Japan came about actually starts with a 
different problem altogether – the debate regarding the 1967 Basic Resident Registers 
Law. Known in Japan as the koseki, or family register, this was a Meiji era system for 
compiling a population database (Yoshino and Murakoshi 1977). This system, however, 
appears to have been a bane to the Japanese ever since. As mentioned in Chapter One, 
public entities at the prefectural level have been very lax when it comes to safeguarding 
the information recorded in the koseki. Part of the problem lies in Article 94 of the 
constitution which states that, “Local public entities shall have the right to manage their 
property, affairs and administration and to enact their own regulations within law”. 
What this means is that even the one 1988 law that Japan has had targeting public 
administrative bodies does not apply to these bodies (Center for Social and Legal 
Research 2000). In 1967, the enactment of the Basic Resident Registers Law made it 
mandatory for information seekers to first obtain the permission of the family 
beforehand. In 1976, the law was amended again to make it compulsory for information 
seekers to stipulate the reasons for wanting to look at the register. 
 
In 1999, the law was again brought to the forefront under the Mori 
administration’s e-government program. The Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI)’s IT Strategy council released a White Paper entitled “Basic IT 
Strategy” in August 2000. The paper referred to Japan’s IT revolution as “far behind 
other nations,” with Internet usage “at the lowest level among major industrial nations” 
due to “high telecommunications fees and restrictions on the use of communication 
networks.” The council also conceived of a strategy to expand Japan’s IT infrastructure 
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in support of not only the development of e-commerce, but the eventual 
implementation of an electronic government as well (Mitchell 2000). One step in the e-
government program was to amend the 1967 Basic Resident Registers Law so that it 
could be placed onto a national electronic network. However, since the Japanese 
government did not have a good record in safekeeping public information as mentioned 
previously, there was intense opposition from the other political parties, including the 
coalition Komeito Party (Privacy and American Business 2003). Specifically, the 
debates in the Diet were centered round the addition of an 11-digit code to the register 
record of every citizen in the absence of any comprehensive data protection law. This 
nationwide ID network (known as Juki Net, which is short for the Basic Resident 
Registers Network System) seeks to place the current resident registry system used in 
Japan online, thus allowing government offices to retrieve this information through the 
use of an eleven digit number unique to each citizen (Kwan 2002). The outcome of the 
debate was the Komeito Party allowing the passage of the amendment in August 1999, 
but on the condition that a data protection law be in force before such an electronic 
system could come into being. This was described in an appended article to the revised 
Resident Registers Law stating that the “government will expedite the taking of all 
necessary measure in expectance of the complete protection of individual data.” The 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had to yield on this since the Komeito’s vacillation, 
together with murmurings of discontent from the opposition parties, were without an 
absolute majority in the Diet. By the time of the Defense Agency Lists revelation in 
May 2002, a poll of half the Diet legislators showed that at least ten LDP and six 




On January 27, 2000, an expert committee was formed by the government to 
draft the Basic Principles of what was to become a Basic Law for Privacy. The 
application of these five principles were to become a major sticking point in the 
passage of the bill; they stipulated that (i) the purpose behind the use of personal 
information had to be clearly defined, and kept to within this scope; (ii) personal 
information had to be acquired under proper legal conditions; (iii) the accuracy and 
currency of personal data must be maintained; (iv) proper measures must be in place to 
ensure the security of the personal information, and (v) individuals must be allowed 
access to their personal information. While these rules did apply to media, academic, 
religious and political organizations in principle, it was not legally binding, and they 
would not have come under the purview of the law per se (Asahi News Service 2002b). 
Yet, it was the fear of a potential government crack down on these organizations that 
made many pundits wary of the Basic Principles. After all, the debacle that was the 
Mori administration had made LDP party stalwarts determined to undermine the 
privacy bill with the hidden aim of protecting the ruling elite from the prying eyes of 
the media (Kyodo News International 2002). 
 
3.2.1 Objections to the Bill 
As the first draft of the privacy bill was entered into the Diet deliberations by 
the ruling coalition on 27 March 2001, it raised objections on many fronts. (The 
coalition here consists of the LDP led by Junichiro Koizumi, the Komeito by Takenori 
Kanzaki, and the New Conservative Party by Takeshi Noda). Firstly, the new bill was 
only applicable to the private sector; this was deemed to be completely unacceptable 
since the underlying debate centered on digitizing the koseki, which required the laws 
to extend to public entities. Second, consumer groups expressed concerns over how 
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individuals might be hampered in their ability to whistle blow on businesses that have 
misused personal information (Asahi News Service 2002c). The crux of their objections, 
however, lay elsewhere. Together with academics, it was a matter of contention for 
them to give Cabinet ministers final say over privacy matters in the industries under 
their jurisdiction considering that the LDP was pro-business (Asahi News Service 
2003a). The third point of contention was the privacy bill’s alleged potential of 
infringing on freedom of information. Identifiable as a subset of the Basic Principles, 
the so-called “transparency clause” was termed as such because it required the means 
and usage of the information attained to be transparent, thus allowing appropriate 
access to the referent of the information. The main source of disapproval came from 
those in mass media. Since journalistic prerogatives sometimes pre-empted the luxury 
of maintaining such transparency, it is little surprise that all the major newspapers and 
commercial television networks remonstrated vehemently. The uproar was especially 
contentious since another “human rights bill” had been tabled “to prevent violations of 
privacy and human rights, such as reporters hounding crime victims to get an 
interview” (Japan Weekly Monitor 2002). The media organizations' florid protests led 
them to lobby several opposition parties, and the result was a three-pronged 
collaboration effort by the Liberal Party, the Japanese Communist Party, and the Social 
Democratic Party to scuttle the newly termed “media control bill” (Mainichi Daily 
News 2002a). An editorial from the Yomiuri Shimbun even drew the personal attention 
of Prime Minister Koizumi, who subsequently asked Ministers of IT and Public 
Management (Heizo Takenaka and Toranosuke Katayama respectively) to “consider 




3.2.2 The Defense Agency Lists Come to Light 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, it was at this time that the Defense Agency Lists 
came into the picture on 28 May 2002. Coming at this inopportune time, the scandal 
provided ammunition for the lawmakers of the four opposition parties. The incident 
clearly showed that it was insufficient to simply trust that government officials 
wouldn’t break the law, and that the privacy bill should also have penalties akin to that 
which was in the equivalent bill being presented for the private sector (Asahi News 
Service 2002c). Prior to this, the absence of punitive measures had always been an 
unimportant oversight for the LDP, which had continually insisted that “bureaucrats are 
legally bound to obey the law in fulfilling their duties” (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2002b). 
This drew a response from Liberal Party member Kentaro Kudo, who commented that, 
“It's not right (to draw up bills) and simply assume that bureaucrats won’t misuse 
private information” (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2002a). In fact, accusations that the LDP 
had obstructed the Defense Agency’s investigations in an attempt to ensure a smooth 
passage for its privacy bills ensured that they would not be passed within the present 
Diet session (Kyodo News International 2002). This was in spite of the fact that it had 
already been extended by forty-two days.  
 
3.2.3 Bill Fails to Pass in Extraordinary Diet Session 
 With the end of the 2002 parliamentary session on 31 July, the ruling coalition 
had no choice but to call for an extraordinary session of the Diet where the privacy bill 
(among other things) would continue to be deliberated. While passage of the bill would 
have been a bonus, this extension was more of a symbolic move for the coalition. With 
Juki Net slated for launch on 5 August, the move was meant to show the Japanese 
public that a privacy law would be passed, even if it was going to be slightly overdue. 
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Under such circumstances, the extraordinary Diet session convened on 18 October, and 
ended with little to show for on the privacy protection front. On December 5, 2002, 
Prime Minister Koizumi resigned himself to the fact that even the moderately revised 
bill would not pass, and resolved to submit a proposal for a completely new bill on the 
last day, December 13, 2002, of the extraordinary Diet session (Mainichi Daily News 
2002b). The proposal pledged to drop the Basic Principles framework, and to set out 
clear definitions of what was to be considered acceptable reporting by the media (Asahi 
News Service 2002f). With the Defense Agency scandal, the ruling coalition was also 
forced to include penalties for administrative bodies during the following session in 
2003 (Privacy and American Business 2003). 
 
3.2.4 Disagreements Carry on Into New Diet Session 
On 20 January, 2003, the 156th Diet session was convened, and so did the 
rivalry between the coalition and opposition lawmakers. The objections were now 
squared upon the revisions that the coalition had proposed in the previous session. 
While the phrase “Basic Principles” had been removed, they continued to exist in the 
new privacy bill. However, since they no longer applied to the mass media (and several 
other institutional entities), there was little more to find fault with since they did adhere 
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Fair Information 
Practices. Instead, the opposition concentrated on demands for stipulations that would 
place control of personal information into their hands of the citizenry. Since the 
government was able to decide on whether individuals are allowed access to their own 
information, and did not have to give any explanation for turning down such a request, 
the whole bill could be considered as an exercise in futility. This was dismissed by 
Hiroyuki Hosoda, the new IT Minister, as a problem of conceptualization. The 
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opposition also wanted a third-party overseer, rather than cabinet ministers, to ensure 
compliance with the new regulations, but the coalition balked at the cost of such an 
endeavour. The debate was also marred by other definitional problems, such as what 
would constitute a media report (Asahi News Service 2003c). Such details were 
important because only information that had been gathered for media reports were 
slated to be beyond the scope of the law, and outside the jurisdiction of the relevant 
cabinet minister. In fact, Junji Asano, director of the Japan Magazine Publishers 
Association, vehemently protested the new bill because it appeared certain that weekly 
magazines would definitely not fall under any of the exempted categories (Mainichi 
Daily News 2003a). 
 
On the whole, however, intricacies of interpretation were things that media 
organizations did not want discussed at the present, but during the lead-up to more 
specific legislations separate from a Basic Law. In an April 7, 2003 editorial, for 
example, the Yomiuri Shimbun not only expressed such a stand, but also demonstrated 
a lack of support for the oppositions’ counter proposals (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2003). 
With regards to the formation of a neutral party to monitor violations, the editorial 
sided with Koizumi’s argument that the plan would lead to “double-supervision” 
(Asahi News Service 2003b). The debate with the opposition parties did lead to two 
additions to the bill, however. The first were non-binding supplementary clauses 
stipulating that the bill should be reviewed three years after coming into force; the 
second was the setting up of an office to handle citizen’s complaints of personal 




3.2.5 The Privacy Bill Finally Passes 
On 25 April, 2003, almost three years after the bill was first proposed, a Lower 
House Special Committee consisting of coalition and opposition parties finally cleared 
the bill. After the opposition parties were out-voted in a Lower House plenary session, 
it was brought over to the Upper House on 6 May (Asahi News Service 2003d). On 22 
May, a Upper House Special Committee endorsed the bill, and it was sanctioned into 
law a day later by a Upper House plenary session (Yoshida 2003).  The five laws that 
have been enacted are (i) the Law Concerning the Protection of Personal Information 
(Basic Law); (ii) the Law Concerning the Protection of Personal Information held by 
Administrative Organs; (iii) the Law Concerning the Protection of Personal Information 
Held by Independent Administrative Agencies; (iv) the Law Concerning the 
Establishment of a Screening Committee for Information Disclosure and Data 
Protection; and (v) the Law Concerning the Establishment of Related Laws 
Accompanying the Enforcement of Related Legislation Concerning the Protection of 
Data Held by Public Administrative Organs. 
 
3.3 Conditions of the POS Fulfilled 
As can be seen from the accounting of the events leading from the initial bill to 
its final passing, many of the conditions leading to mass opposition as espoused by 
Tarrow and singled out for this paper were met. First, the LDP did not have a majority 
in the Diet, and was depending on its coalition partners for support in pushing through 
the amendment to the Resident Registers Law (1). Furthermore, because Japan’s 
constitution protects the sovereignty of its municipalities, there was a danger that they 
would not voluntarily connect to Juki Net. Thus, the LDP can be said to have been in a 
position of weakness in ensuring compliance to it’s e-government program(2), and had 
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to compromise on promising a legal solution to the privacy issue. When the LDP 
decided to insert the clause restricting free speech in their initial bill, this was seen by 
the media as a direct attack on their journalistic freedom (3). They lobbied the 
lawmakers in opposition to the LDP-coalition’s proposal, and became a staunch non-
political ally (4). The opposition parties too, were quick to revise their stand against the 
bill from one that criticized its lack of measures protecting privacy rights, to one that 
disputed against its attack on freedom of speech. This convergence of interests created 
a fortified resistance to the LDP-coalition’s bill (5), and they were forced to withdraw 
and make revisions to it. Yet, once the revised bill exempted the mass media (except 
for weeklies) from ministerial supervision, the tide turned. The media was always only 
against any infringements on their right to free speech, and were not into opposing the 
government’s revised bill even though no changes had been made in the areas 
regarding privacy protection. Instead, they were content to retain the status quo, 
preserving their relationship as before with the bureaucracy. As per the general rule of 
the POS, the mass media switched to the side of the LDP-coalition, and the opposition 
lawmakers lost their initiative in amending the revised bill further. Thus, there was a 
shift in the climate surrounding the passing of the privacy bill, but the impetus had 
never been one of privacy protection. If only one of the factors could have been a 
catalyst for policy change, it is not surprising that in this particular case, the LDP-led 
coalition was forced into a corner with its initial bill. However, privacy rights were 
never truly the crux of the debate, but rather had always been a means to an end. Thus, 
while there were some changes to the bill, can they be expected to be centered upon the 
protection of personal information? For further evidence that the law at present 
maintains things as they always have been, Chapter Four will involve a short discussion 
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into some areas of the new law that have been subject to widespread criticism. This will 
be followed by the conclusion to this paper.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW AND CONCLUSION 
 
4.1 Legal Informality 
 Before any meaningful discussion can be entered into, a means with which to 
benchmark the new law is necessary. For this paper, the concept of “legal informality” 
as propounded by Frank K. Upham in Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan will 
be drawn upon. In his book, informality is used to describe the nature of the Japanese 
litigation process. Upham argues that the entire policy formulation process is one that 
starts with prior deliberation between the ruling elites (politicians and bureaucrats). 
Thus, the resulting piece of legislation is one that has to serve the interests of all, rather 
than just the group with which the new law is being called into existence for. Very 
often, this involves a law that doesn’t challenge the existing framework, and entails an 
ambiguity in its contents that makes it more of a hindrance to litigation, and which 
provides a mediating role for the bureaucracy in dispute settlement. This second point 
is what in Upham terms as verticality – a situation where people are forced to be 
dependent on state mediation mechanisms instead of the judiciary. Thus, for the new 
privacy law to be revolutionary, it needs to show that it has placed the interests of 
Japanese citizens at the first and foremost, and has provided them with the necessary 
means to depend on the courts for redress. 
 
4.2 Is the New Law Fundamentally Different? 
With regards to Japan’s ‘new’ privacy law, it should now be evident that it goes 
out of its way to preserve the legal informal environment as described by Upham. What 
really should have been the crux of the privacy debate was how control over personal 
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information in the koseki could be placed into the hands of individual Japanese. 
Professor Alan F. Westin concluded from a survey2 he conducted under the auspices of 
the Japan-U.S. Privacy and Data Protection Program, that an individual-choice 
approach was the future envisioned by the Japanese citizenry (Akagawa 2000). The 
basis of such a system would resemble that which has been implemented by Yokohama 
mayor Hiroshi Nakada, in which residents have a choice over whether their records will 
be digitized (Asahi News Service 2002e). Legislated on a national level, this would 
have truly been a remarkable new privacy ruling. While the opposition parties had 
tabled this “right to self-control” aspect to be included in the privacy bill, it is not 
surprising at all that it became muffled under the larger cry for the protection of free 
speech. When the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led coalition was able to appease 
the media’s requests (with weekly magazines as the scapegoat), this essentially signaled 
the end of any ardent opposition on their part. Without their support, the opposition 
parties lacked the backing that was necessary to return the focus of the privacy bill 
debate back onto the rights of the individual.  
 
4.3 Continuation of the Vertical Structure 
 The fact that the mass media were wary of any third-party intervention over 
their activities suggests a desire on their part to maintain the status quo between them 
and the government. While this particular relationship continues to be nuanced after the 
bill was revised (the mass media is exempted from direct ministerial intervention), it is 
certainly explicit that all other industries will fall directly under the purview of their 
relevant ministries. At this juncture, only time will tell if the pro-business LDP will 
implement soft guidance, as it did with the Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
                                                 
2  The survey, conducted through telephone, was carried out in November 1999, and involved a 
nationwide sample of 1000 men and women from ages twenty-five to forty. 
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(EEOL), or whether it will truly clamp down on information privacy infringers. 
Furthermore, until more intrinsic statutes are promulgated in the future, interpretation 
of the new privacy law is very much at the behest of the government. Of course, a 
Basic Law is inherently ambiguous, and the reason given for why the word “privacy” is 
not even spelt out once in the new law is because it encompasses too many areas with 
no legal precedent (Mikami, Shimizu, and Nitta 2005). However, while the right to 
privacy can be defined under case law, the Basic Law as it stands does not support such 
an environment. The exact details to be filled in have been left to the discretion of 
ministries through the issuance of guidelines. Thus, rather than being in the hands of 
the judiciary, it is instead to be decided by the various cabinet ministers. Masatomo 
Suzuki (2005), who is a prominent figure on many privacy guideline committees, has 
commented with regards to the new law that: 
 
“...all the cabinet ministers have been accorded the right to conduct inquiries into 
administration, administer guidance, take measures etc. (Articles 32-34, 37-40, 46-
48), ...the privacy law cannot be assessed to be one that has freedom protecting 
functions (pp. 10-11). ...As a general rule, the individual cannot seek trial under this 
law without dealing with the bureaucracy. What this means is that the individual cannot 
but reflexively receive aid from the bureaucratic establishment (pp. 27-28).” 
 
The root of the “problem” can probably be traced back to the 2001 Law 
Concerning Disclosure of Information Held by Administrative Agencies. Under this 
law, public entities have the right to refuse the disclosure of information to the 
individual if they deem the request to be inappropriate. What is appropriate, however, 
currently seems to be an arbitrarily decision made by the officials in charge of 
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information disclosure. The unpredictable nature of the disclosure law thus brings up 
fundamental problems to the whole issue of personal information protection; how can 
any action be taken on something you might not even be able to get access to. If your 
request was turned down, you would have no way of knowing exactly what personal 
information was in the hands of the government, much less how it was being used by 
them. Thus, the lack of a transparent system ensuring access to one’s personal 
information places the individual at the mercy of the government, and essentially 
makes a moot point of any other stipulations in the law.  
 
Even if the requisition for personal information could be made successfully, the 
current law makes it unclear as to how the individual might take legal action. For sure, 
when it comes to the Japanese citizenry, the verticality of the new law has been 
maintained in a far-reaching way due to its ambiguous nature. This was exactly what 
the opposition parties were protesting against from the beginning – that the new bill did 
not define clearly enough what the right to privacy meant. Without such a definition, it 
becomes extremely difficult for one to depend on the new law for protection. This goes 
directly against the crux of the rational for its existence. In order to fulfill its charter, 
which states in Article One that it is to “protect the rights of individuals,” it is necessary 
to establish the boundaries of what the rights to privacy and self-control of information 
are. Suzuki (2005) elaborates on this, saying that: 
 
“I am expecting that with regard to personal information, it will be made clear to whom 
it belongs to, the system by which how this is determined, and the extent of 
participation allowed to the individual. ...no rights generally related to personal 
information exist under the present law. Provisionally, even if the body that owns the 
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information is defined, as individual data is not an object with rights, there is no 
assurance as to what rights the individual can exercise when there is an infringement (p. 
21).” 
 
Thus, while it is an improvement that penalties will be imposed on public 
officials as well, the ultimately question of who you can sue within the vast 
bureaucracy remains. The inherent makeup of Juki Net means that once your 
information is online, it is available for retrieval for each and every public 
administrative body. Does the individual take issue with the local municipality where 
the information had been uploaded, or is the point of the leak where the focus of 
litigation should begin. The government has, at least for the time being, managed to 
make it an upheaval battle for anyone who wishes to take it to task for any misconduct 
by leaving out the very necessary details as pointed out by Suzuki. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 As the description of the privacy law’s passage in Chapter Three has shown, the 
LDP’s decision to place a privacy bill on its agenda for the 2000 Diet session was 
hardly provoked by the general public concern towards information privacy. 
Throughout the 80s and 90s, it had been advocating self-regulation for the private 
sector, and was even more nonchalant towards legislation directed at itself. However, 
since the central government could do little to force local administrations to partake in 
the Juki Net project, this meant that the LDP could not simply ignore the trepidation 
that people felt towards it either. A populace that was not particularly disgruntled 
would mean less resistance to Juki Net from public administrators below the prefectural 
level.  
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 When the initial bill was proposed, the decades-old mentality of the LDP was 
clearly visible. There were no penalties fixed for public entities on the one hand, and 
final say over punitive measures imposed on the private sector was retained in the 
hands of the relevant ministry. Not surprisingly, the bill drew little support from 
opposition members of the Diet, who felt that the original intent of the law as a 
safeguard for the digitized koseki had been marginalized. However, the move by the 
LDP to shackle the free press was the real coup scored by the opposition. Using the 
Basic Principles as a pretext, the LDP drew the ire of media organizations which saw 
the principles as little more than an attempt at rescinding their journalistic rights. The 
opposition saw its opportunity, and immediately took up the mantle as the defender of 
free speech. This happened as media organizations lobbied them for support in forcing 
the LDP to repeal its privacy bill. Indeed, because the issue of free speech affected such 
a broad spectrum the – the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters in Japan, 
the Association of Japanese Broadcast Writers, the Association of Scenario Writers in 
Japan, the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, the Japan Magazine Publishers 
Association, the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association, and the Japan 
Book Publisher’s Association etc. all voiced their objections vociferously. Apart from 
the large commercial vendors, authors and freelance journalists also came together 
under the banner of the “Rejection of the Privacy Bill! Collaborative Appeal Society 
(http://www.interq.or.jp/japan/s9d/)” to spread public awareness on the “dangers” of 
the new law. Consumers were represented by the Housewives’ Association (Shufuren) 
and the National Liaison Committee of Consumers' Organizations (Zenkoku 
Shōdanren), which asked for the government to respect the rights of the individual, and 
to impose penalties on public entities. Academics were represented as well, notably by 
the IT specialist Masao Horibe, who is a Professor at the Chuo University School of 
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Law and Emeritus Professor at Hitotsubashi University. All these groups had come 
together with the collective aim to block the passage of the coalition’s privacy bill. In 
contrast, even feminists groups involved in pushing for the EEOL in 1986 were in 
disagreement on the limits to which women should be protected. The lack of concert 
among the organizations pressing for more equality in the workplace may have led to a 
greater watering down of the law, than if all parties concerned had been united behind a 
single scheme. 
 
Emboldened by the raucous that had been raised by their newfound allies, the 
opposition parties were able to stand their ground all the way past an extended Diet 
session. The ruling coalition was left with little choice but to revise their proposal in 
preparation for the 2003 Diet session. The revisions gave ground on several issues, but 
remained essentially unchanged. The Basic Principles remained in the bill bereft of 
only the title heading itself. Penalties were imposed on offenders working in public 
administration, but the means with which they could actually be charged were left 
ambiguous (this will be covered in more detail later in the chapter). Yet, the bill in this 
form was able to pass through the Diet relatively effortlessly. The primary reason that 
can explain this sudden turn of events was a key change in the revised bill – that 
newsgathering bodies would be free from ministerial intervention. This had important 
implications in terms of structural opportunity. Satisfied with this key concession from 
the coalition, media organizations were no longer as committed in grounding passage 
of the bill to a halt. On the contrary, they were looking forward to the existence of a 
stable framework within which to work. This also meant that there was only lacklustre 
support for the privacy bill proposals submitted by the opposition parties. These were 
centered upon the setting up of a third-party organization to act as a privacy watchdog 
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supplanting the jurisdiction of the relevant ministry, and overall empowerment of the 
individual’s information control rights. While media organizations were hardly 
concerned with the latter aims, they were understandably ambivalent towards someone 
else other than the government acting as overseer. The LDP too, had not come out of 
this exchange a loser. Since weekly magazines did not count as a news organization, 
they were subjected to administrative guidance from above. The LDP thus gained a 
victory of sorts since scandals had a tendency of emerging from these rather than the 
mainstream newspapers. As the LDP had also agreed to re-look the law three years 
after its enactment, there was no longer a need for the media to quibble over the 
vagaries of what was after all a Basic Law; it was expected that individual stipulations 
would come eventually for the various industries. In addition to all that was happening 
within the confines of Japan, a second structural change that happened at the same time 
was the U.S. invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003. With this turn of events 
overshadowing the Diet, the privacy bill had been sidelined by a debate over whether 
the Self Defense Forces (SDF) could be deployed to Iraq. The exigency of discussions 
regarding the possible role of the SDF in Iraq’s reconstruction coupled with the loss of 
interest from media organizations spelt for the most part the end of further debate on 
the privacy bill until a future date. 
 
This paper has looked at two questions regarding Japan’s “new” privacy law. 
The first was why the LDP decided to sponsor one in the first place, and the second was 
whether the law was a revolutionary one. The answer to the first question is that the 
LDP was essentially forced down the road of privacy legislation. The LDP is a 
conservative party, and changing the legal informal environment was never on its 
agenda. It was always a means to an end rather than an end in itself. However, when the 
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means trampled on the toes of the mass media, a hornet’s nest was stirred. Yet, since 
the ensuing debate was never so much about privacy rights, but whether it stymied the 
media’s reporting freedoms, the revisions to the bill never touched on its problems 
regarding the protection of privacy. Thus, it is possible to answer the second question 
with a resounding no. Even with its enactment, the Japanese government has managed 
to preserve its controlling power in its entirety, as the right to control their own 
information has not been passed down to the individual at all. Thus, the revised bill 
creates an environment that is lacking completely in the area of protecting privacy 
rights, and the LDP has managed to preserve the legal informal status quo. 
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APPENDIX A 
Sectoral Laws for Private Enterprises Relating to Privacy 





Prohibits the collection, 
retention, and use of job 
seeker’s information 
beyond the original 
purpose of collection, and 
also to ensure the security 
of this information 
None 
Radio Law (1950) 59 Prohibits the interception 
and divulgence of radio 
communications 
Imprisonment of 
up to 2 years or a 




9 Prohibits the interception 
of cabled communications 
Imprisonment of 
up to 3 years or a 
fine of up to 
¥1,000,000 
Instalment Sales Law 
(1961) 
 
39 Prohibits the use of credit 
information outside of 






30 Prohibits the use of credit 
information outside of 









intercepting the private 
communication of users  
Imprisonment of 
up to 2 years or a 
fine of up to 
¥1,000,000 
Law for Securing the 




Conditions for Dispatched 
Workers (1985) 
7, 24 Prohibits the collection, 
retention, and use of 
dispatched worker’s 
information beyond the 
original purpose of 
collection, and also to 
ensure the security of this 
information 
None 
Law Concerning the 
Prevention of AIDS 
(1989) 
14 Prohibits physicians from 
releasing the diagnosis of 
patients without justifiable 
reasons 
Imprisonment of 
up to 1 year or a 
fine of up to 
¥300,000 
Unfair Competition 
Prevention Law (1993) 
2 Prohibits the acquiring 
and dissemination of trade 
secrets 
Imprisonment of 
up to 3 years or a 
fine of up to 
¥3,000,000 
Unauthorized Computer 
Access Law (2000) 
3, 4 Prohibits acts of 
unauthorized computer 
access; prohibits acts of 
Imprisonment of 
up to 1 year or a 





¥500,000; fine of 
up to ¥300,000 
respectively 
Wiretapping Law (2000) - Permits the police to use 
wiretaps to learn of crimes 
that are being plotted 
N.A. 






Bans the possession and 
theft of electromagnetic 
information through 
skimming (in addition to 




up to 5 years or a 
fine of up to 
¥300,000; 
Imprisonment up 
to 10 years 
respectively 
Law for Securing the 




Conditions for Dispatched 




agencies to only collect 
personal information 
appropriate to its 
dispatching task, and to 
ensure the security of such 
information 
Fine of up to 
¥300,000 
Law Concerning the 
Protection of Personal 
Information (2005) 
- Provides a framework for 




up to 6 months or 





















３ 海幕三等海佐開示請求者リスト事案につい  
【事案の概要】 




Ø        Ａ三佐は、これら個人情報を開示請求書のほか、インターネット、内局及び各
幕の情報公開担当者とのやりとり、雑誌等から入手。 
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Ø        Ａ三佐は、平成１３年４月から平成１４年３月までの間、自己の作成した開示
請求者リストを、日頃業務上関係のあった内局各幕の情報公開室の担当者や以前から
の顔見知りであった海幕調査課担当者等の計９名へフロッピーディスク等で配布。 
Ø         調査の結果、最終的に１４名が同リストの受領、閲覧又は保管に関与。 




Ø        Ａ三佐が作成した開示請求者リストは、請求者の行政機関電算処理個人情報保
護法（「個人情報保護法」）上の個人情報を含みかつフロッピーディスク等の媒体で
記録されたもので、同法上の「個人情報ファイル」に該当。 




Ø        Ａ三佐が当該リストを情報公開室以外に配布した行為は、個人情報をみだりに
他人に知らせてはならない旨を定めた同法第１２条に違反。 
Ø        Ａ三佐の上司については、個人情報保護法に抵触するものではないが、Ａ三佐
のリスト作成等を黙認し、また、自ら引き継ぎを受けるなど、対応としては極めて不
適切。 







Ø        内局、陸幕及び空幕のＬＡＮ上のホームページに、 
Ø        内局については、個人名は記載されていないが「請求件名」中に請求者のイニ
シャルや団体を示す略語が記載されているリスト 
Ø        陸幕については、個人名は記載されていないが「摘要欄」中に、開示請求者の
職業、会社名等が記載（「オンブズマン」、「市民団体」、「○○新聞」等）されてい
るリスト 
Ø        空幕については、個人名は記載されていないが「請求者区分」欄中に、開示請
求者の職業等が記載（「ラジオ・テレビ」、「オンブズマン」等）されているリスト
が掲載されていることが判明。 
Ø        これを受け、内局、陸幕及び空幕の情報公開室において、ホームぺージへの掲
載の中断及び該当部分の削除等の措置を実施。なお、これらの措置については、大臣
まで適時の報告はなされず。 
Ø        以上について、６月３日に大臣から指示を受け、事実関係及び関係法令の解釈
について、さらなる徹底した調査を開始。 
Ø        調査の結果、上記リストには、開示請求者の氏名は記載されていないこと、及
び開示請求者を特定できるような情報は記載されていないことを確認。 
Ø        また、個人情報保護法を所管する総務省に法律の解釈を照会し、認定した事実
に基づけば、これらの開示請求に関するリストについて違法性はない旨の最終的結論
を得たところ。 









Ø        このため、事案の概要に掲げたような事実関係にもかかわらず、内局、陸幕及
び空幕ＬＡＮ上に違法な個人情報リストが掲示されているとの印象を国民に与えてし
まったことは不適切。 
Ø        さらに、個人に関する情報の取り扱いについては慎重であるべきところ、その
点において配慮に欠けたことは不適切。 
Ø        いわゆるＬＡＮ上における個人情報の削除問題については、イニシャル等だけ
の記載であっても違法となるかも知れないとの考えの下、既存のデータに上書きする
ことで、情報公開業務に直接必要のないデータは失われた。 
Ø        陸幕、空幕は削除前のデータを保存し、内局も安易な気持ちで削除しており、
いずれも証拠隠しの意図はなし。 
Ø        しかしながら、内局、陸幕及び空幕の担当者が上司への報告なしにＬＡＮ上に
掲載された資料から情報公開業務に直接必要のないイニシャル等を削除した行為は、
証拠隠しと言われてもやむを得ず、認識が甘く不注意。 







Ø        施設部施設企画課所属の情報公開担当の専門官は、同部の開示請求処理状況の
進行管理等を目的としたリストを作成。その中には開示請求書に記入された個人情報
に該当する氏名及び所属団体名等を転記。 




Ø        当該リストは、同専門官の判断で作成され、作成・掲示に際し、上司たる施設
部長、施設企画課長への報告・了承はなし。 
【評価】 
Ø        開示請求書に記入された氏名等の個人情報は、開示請求に係る業務を迅速かつ
適切に実施するためのものであり、当該リストの保有の目的の達成に必要な限度を超
えているとは言えず、個人情報保護法第４条第２項の問題は生じず。 






Ø        今般の調査の過程で、防衛庁内の情報公開業務において、全般的に個人情報保
護に対する認識が十分ではなかったことが明らかとなり、国民に不安と疑念を与えた
ことは遺憾。 
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